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Abstract
Recent decades have seen a revived interest in super-substantivalism, the idea that
spacetime is the only fundamental substance and matter some kind of aspect, property
or consequence of spacetime structure. However, the metaphysical debate so far has
misidentified a particular variant of super-substantivalism with the position per se. I
distinguish between a super-substantival core commitment and different ways of flesh-
ing it out. In particular, I distinguish between two categories of super-substantival
positions: modest and radical super-substantivalism. I argue that only the latter
engages with physics in an interesting way and offers metaphysics the possibility to
motivate new research programmes in physics, rather than defending positions that
can be maintained no matter what physics tells us about the nature of spacetime.
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1 Introduction
What does the universe consist of? A popular answer, at least among physicists, might be
well expressed by the title of a famous book by Hermann Weyl: Space-Time-Matter. The
shouting and screaming starts when one asks about the relationship between space and time
(or spacetime), on the one hand, and matter, on the other.
The modern debate normally distinguishes between two positions with regard to the
ontological status of spacetime. Either spacetime is fundamental, i.e. a substance in its own
right (substantivalism), or only material bodies are fundamental, and space and time are
just abstractions of or derive from the relationships between material bodies (relationalism).
The first position is often traced back to Newton, the second to Leibniz.1 But there is a
third possibility, a position about which most remain silent, as if it were a cautiously guarded
family secret — and even though it has an equally magnificent set of forefathers as the other
two camps, among them Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Clifford and also Newton.2
Sklar (1974) has called this position super-substantivalism. The idea is simple. Substanti-
valists claim that there are two kinds of fundamental substances in the world: spacetime and
matter.3 Relationalists claim that there is only one kind of fundamental substance: matter.
Super-substantivalists agree that there is only one (kind of) fundamental substance in the
world. But, they hasten to add, this fundamental substance is not matter but spacetime.
According to the super-substantivalist, every-thing in the world is spacetime.4
This position may seem logically possible but slightly non-common-sensical, and so I
hastened to refer to its famous ancestors. Yet they are not what matters in the end; the
question is which position is the best to adopt. There are different reasons one can have for
judging one of the three positions to be better than the other two. One oft quoted criterion
is Occam’s Razor: the most parsimonious position is regarded as having a clear advantage.
However, parsimony has to be balanced with explanatory power: if a position can explain
more than its rivals, then we may be willing to accept that it postulates more fundamental
entities or kinds of entities.5
1See Section 2 for a more precise definition of the core commitment of substantivalism.
2For details on the predecessors of modern super-substantivalism see Graves (1972) and Skow (2005); for
an argument that at least the early Newton was a super-substantivalist see Thomas (2013b), chapter 3.
3I will argue below that strictly speaking the substantivalist core commitment does not commit one to
any assumption about the nature of matter, but just to the claim that spacetime is a substance in a sense
to be specified. Still, most (spacetime) substantivalists presuppose that matter is a fundamental substance,
too. As we will see, if one defines substantivalism as a commitment only to the fundamentality of space or
spacetime, super-substantivalism is a (more radical) version of substantivalism.
4Of course, one can also be a super-substantivalist with regard to space rather than spacetime, and
naturally Descartes and Clifford were super-substantivalists of this stripe (regarding space/matter; of course,
Descartes was a dualist with regard to space/mind). However, after the development of the general theory
of relativity, super-substantivalism with regard to spacetime seems promising. (Note, though, that the
development of a super-substantival version of the 3-dimensional ‘shape dynamics’, see e.g. Barbour (2012),
would be very interesting indeed.) For convenience, I will restrict the discussion to super-substantivalism
with respect to spacetime, although much of what I say will also apply to the corresponding position that
takes space as the only fundamental substance.
5Of course, judgements on how explanatory a given theory is may vary depending on one’s account of
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We should note that both criteria can be stated without explicit recourse to the theories
of space, time and matter provided by physics. One might be tempted to regard this as an
advantage. However, one may also defend the view that good metaphysics should rest on
a conceptual analysis of physics; whether we should adopt substantivalism, relationalism or
super-substantivalism depends to a large extent on which position is most compatible with
our best physical theories of space, time and matter.
It is exactly this idea that has driven many philosophers of physics since the completion
of the General Theory of Relativity (GR for short) in 1915. The question was not so much
whether we find substantivalism or relationalism more intuitive or more advantageous for
purely philosophical reasons. Rather, the question was whether, given GR, which has been
accepted as at least approximately true, we should adopt a substantivalist or a relationalist
position with regard to the nature of spacetime and matter. Pursuing this question turned
out to be enormously fruitful for philosophy, for it facilitated the insight that substantivalism
and relationalism were not positions but families of positions. This development started with
the rediscovery of Einstein’s 1913 hole argument by Stachel (1989), a paper first presented
at the 1980 conference on General Relativity and Gravitation in Jena. Earman & Norton
(1987) used the argument as the basis for the claim that a substantival position in the
context of GR would lead to indeterminism — a position that should be avoided if there was
a philosophical position available (notably relationalism) that did not commit one to either
determinism or indeterminism. The subsequent philosophical discussion brought about an
entire family of substantivalist and relationalist positions, and, as it turned out, the hole
argument carries the threat of indeterminism only for some of them; positions that many
regarded as disadvantageous anyhow.6
No such discussion, with GR and other relativistic spacetime theories as background, has
yet taken place for super-substantivalism. Instead, in recent years the position has mostly
been discussed in the field of pure metaphysics, and has been argued (e.g. by Lewis (1986),
Sider (2001) and Schaffer (2009)) to be philosophically advantageous to substantivalism at
least.
However, just as in the philosophical discussion prior to the rediscovery of the hole ar-
gument, much of the literature does not clearly distinguish between the core commitment of
any super-substantival position, on the one hand, and the properties, advantages and short-
comings of different concrete variants of super-substantivalism on the other. I shall proceed
as follows. In section 2, I will isolate the core commitment of super-substantivalism. Section
3 will deal with the two most promising arguments in favour of super-substantivalism as
compared to the substantivalist and relationalist core commitments. In both cases, I will
show that these arguments do not speak as clearly in favour of the super-substantivalist pro-
gramme as their recent proponents have claimed. Instead, I argue, both arguments can serve
merely as a strong motivation to work out the landscape of super-substantival positions in
explanation, and indeed on one’s interpretation of the theory in question.
6In section 2, I will isolate what I call the ‘core commitment’ that all versions of substantivalism share; a
similar isolation may be possible for relationalist standpoints. Some of the main variants of substantivalism
produced by the debate can be found in Maudlin (1989), Butterfield (1989), Hoefer (1996) and Pooley
(forthcoming); see in particular Pooley (2013) for a comprehensive overview and analysis of the debate.
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detail. Any entirely convincing argument in favour of super-substantivalism, just as in the
cases of substantivalism and relationalism, can be had only with respect to concrete variants
going beyond the core commitment. For only then does super-sustantivalism have enough
substance in order for the question of its compatibility with modern physics to be non-trivial;
only then can the position couple to physics productively. Thus, section 4 distinguishes be-
tween different ways of extending the core commitment, while section 5 distinguishes between
two classes of extensions, two sets of super-substantival positions: modest and radical super-
substantivalism. I conclude with a plea for radical super-substantivalism, arguing for its
heuristic potential in inspiring research in physics, as well as for the philosophical fruit it
promises us for a future harvest.
2 The core commitment of super-substantivalism
In order to characterise the core commitment of super-substantivalism, we first have to isolate
the core of substantivalism.
Both Norton (1989) and Maudlin (1989) assume that a substantivalist has to accept that
if a piece of matter is translated three feet in some direction, he then faces a new physical
situation, even if the relationships between that piece of matter and all other matter in
the universe (if there is any) have not changed. The intuition is that for a substantivalist
something important has changed: the piece of matter is located in this part of spacetime
here rather than in that over there, where it was before it was moved.
Norton and Maudlin are in substantial agreement with Leibniz and Clarke:7 they both
believe that if one is a substantivalist (using the modern term), then one is committed to
seeing a world where ‘everything is translated three feet in some direction’ as a different
possible world from the actual one.
Pooley (forthcoming) argues that this commitment does not follow from the central
metaphysical commitment of the substantivalist position. He writes (p.85):8
As I understand the position, substantivalism is simply a commitment to the
real existence of space and its parts (the possible places of material bodies) as
concrete, basic entities in the world. The emphasis on ‘basic’ is intended to
underline the contrast with the relationalist, who can agree that there is a sense
in which places (i.e., the actual and possible locations of bodies) exist, but who
will deny that they are elements of the world’s ground-floor ontology. For the
relationalist only the (ultimate constituents of) material bodies are basic in this
sense. The existence of places, and thus of space, is derivative. It is parasitic on
the actual and possible spatial relations that can hold between material objects.
For the relationalist, space is thus ontologically dependent on bodies. For the
substantivalist, space is (at least) ontologically on a par with its material content.
7See Leibniz (1956).
8Pooley writes about substantivalism with respect to space here, but what he says generalises directly to
spacetime.
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This does seem to be the core commitment of the substantivalist, and it does indeed not
imply that parts of space or spacetime possess primitive thisness, i.e., the substantivalist
is committed to regard two parts of spacetime as intrinsically different from one another.
As a matter of fact, the position does not even commit the substantivalist to the claim
that the parts of spacetime are points — they could be atomistic regions, or something else
entirely. Nor does the substantivalist as such have to be sure about which mathematical
object(s) represent spacetime, how many dimensions it has, or whether the causal structure
of spacetime is compatible with its path structure.9
Of course, the substantivalist will want answers to all these questions eventually; and
especially the discussion originating with the rediscovery of the hole argument and Earman’s
and Norton’s discussion of it produced more than one answer to the question of how a smart
substantivalist should answer at least some of the questions above. But the point is that the
substantivalist core commitment as such does not commit to any particular answer to any
of these questions.
Thus, we can summarise the commitment in the following way:
Substantivalist core commitment : Spacetime is a (kind of) substance, and a sub-
stance is a basic (or fundamental) concrete object that is not derivative of any-
thing else.10
This is the commitment shared by all variants of substantivalism. Every characterisation
that goes beyond the core commitment is already a particular, more concrete, variant of
substantivalism.11 And we do need these variants, for as it stands the core commitment is
9Ehlers et al. (1972) have argued that the causal structure of spacetime is identical to its conformal
structure, i.e. to its being endowed with an equivalence class of metrics gµν at every spacetime point. They
identify the path structure of spacetime with its projective structure and define a condition of compatibility
between conformal and projective structure. Only if the condition is fullfilled do we have a unique affine
structure, which distinguishes geodesics from non-geodesics. And only if the curvature structure defined by
the affine structure fulfils another condition (that of the vanishing of Weylian length curvature) do we have
the pseudo-Riemannian spacetime upon which the formulation of GR rests.
10Schaffer (2009) traces this notion of substance back to Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza. For a discussion
of the notion of being ‘basic’ see Schaffer (2008), section 3.1. (Note that Schaffer introduces ‘basic’ as a “lower
bound of ontological priority”; I will use the latter concept in the definition of the super-substantivalist core
commitment below.) Thomas (2013b) provides the most careful analysis of how the term ‘substance’ has
been used as applied to space and spacetime from the Greeks to modern metaphysics; and argues that it is
anachronistic to define ‘substance’ as a concrete irreducible object. She also isolates two core commitments of
substantivalists, which contains the above core commitment as a proper subset. The second core commitment
she argues the substantivalist to have is a commitment towards some relationship between space or spacetime
and matter, while different substantivalists may differ with regard to the nature of this relationship. I agree
that virtually all substantivalists hold such a commitment; but I do not think they have to because of their
being space or spacetime substantivalists.
11Note that the referent of ‘spacetime’ in this commitment is the spacetime of the actual world. It is
perfectly possible to believe that spacetime is a substance in the sense defined above without believing that
it has to be a substance in all possible worlds. Indeed, most substantivalists who have adopted the position
because they think it is the best interpretation of GR and other modern spacetime theories would be happy to
admit that in a world in which substantially different laws of nature (especially those governing the relations
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just the skeleton of a position; it needs flesh and muscles in the form of answers to the above
questions in order to wrestle with physics’ theories of spacetime. Of course, different reasons
will speak for the adoption of different variants.
Let us now come to super-substantivalism. Super-substantivalists agree with substanti-
valists that spacetime is a substance in the sense described above. But substantivalists allow
that spacetime is just one of the (kinds of) substances in the world, whereas they typically ac-
cept matter as the second (kind of) substance. This is the step whereby super-substantivalists
break ranks with substantivalists; they thus have the following core commitment:
Super-Substantivalist core commitment : Spacetime is the only (kind of) sub-
stance.
The first sentence of the super-substantivalist core commitment leaves open whether
spacetime is the only substance (i.e. the only fundamental entity) or the only kind of
substance. In the latter case, one would say that parts of spacetime are substances (i.e.
basic), rather than (just) spacetime as a whole. If one were to claim that spacetime is
the only entity, one would link super-substantivalism to priority monism, i.e. the position
that the whole (here spacetime) is ontologically prior to its parts. While one may defend
this position, it is not part of the super-substantivalist core position: one can believe that
spacetime is ontologically prior to everything else without necessarily believing that the
whole of spacetime is in turn ontologically prior to its parts.12
Note that, just as the substantivalist core commitment, the super-substantivalist one
does not say anything about matter. However, every super-substantivalist will agree that
they have to say something about matter right after uttering the core commitment; what is
the relationship between spacetime as the only (kind of) substance, and matter?
Maybe the most well-known answer has been given by what Schaffer (2009) has called
‘the identity view’. According to this position, the core commitment is followed by saying
that matter is identical to spacetime regions. Depending on how this view is cashed out
further (I will write more on this in section 4), one may well argue that rather than showing
that spacetime is in some way more fundamental than matter, the position alleges that there
is no real distinction between the two in the first place. After all, spacetime and matter are
identified, and one might as well have written ‘Matter is the only kind of substance’ in the
core commitment. Then, this version of super-substantivalism has been extended in such a
way that it goes full circle and becomes identical to a version of relationalism. What started
out as a project to base ontology on spacetime rather than on matter might then end up
abandoning the very distinction of spacetime and matter.13
between spacetime structure of matter) hold spacetime might not be a substance. Either way, believing that
spacetime is essentially a substance would go beyond the core commitment of substantivalism as defined
here. Furthermore, the core commitment of substantivalism does not commit to two regions of spacetime in
distinct worlds as being primitively transworld identifiable with one another.
12I will discuss different options for extending the core commitment in section 4 and 5. Some of them
involve adopting priority monism with respect to spacetime; others pluralism; and others still different
options for what the parts of spacetime are.
13I do not believe that all versions of the identity view have to face this danger, but the position Schaffer
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Thus, instead of extending the super-substantival core commitment to the identity view,
we could extend it by adding the sentence ‘Thus, spacetime is ontologically prior to mat-
ter’. I will call the core commitment ammended thus the ‘minimal extension of the super-
substantival core commitment which takes spacetime as ontologically prior to matter’, or
‘MESP’ for short. The extension is minimal because it does not yet spell out the notion of
‘ontological priority’. What is it supposed to mean that something (in this case spacetime)
is ontologically prior to something else (in this case everything)? Different accounts of onto-
logical priority (and, connected to that, ontological dependence) have been put forward. The
rough idea is that A is ontologically prior to B iff the existence of A implies or contains the
existence of B but not vice versa. Depending on your precise notion of ontological depen-
dence (and any other metaphysical commitments you may have), B supervening on A might
be sufficient for A to be ontologically prior to B; or supervenience might only be necessary
and reducibility sufficient. For our purposes, the missing consensus of what ‘ontologically
prior’ means is actually an advantage, for it allows us to use the term in MESP position,
and to have different ways of cashing out ‘ontologically prior’ correspond to different ways
of extending MESP further, different concreter versions of super-substantivalism.14
What speaks in favour of the super-substantivalist core position? Not common sense,
surely. But if other arguments speak in favour of it compared to its rivals — e.g. its parsi-
mony or its higher compatibility with modern physics — then we may decide not to worry
about common sense too much. Either way, just as in the case of substantivalism, isolating
the core commitment is just where work begins. The real interest of super-substantivalism
lies in its particular variants rather than in the core commitment shared by all of them, and
we will look at some such variants in sections 4 and 5. Nonetheless, we need first to review
the two main arguments that have been put forward for super-substantivalism in general
(i.e., the core commitment).
3 The two main arguments for super-substantivalism
per se
3.1 Parsimony
Even though philosophers of physics have looked at super-substantivalism only in passing in
recent decades,15 metaphysicians have argued with passion on behalf of super-substantivalism,
(2009) calls the unrestricted identity view (discussed further in section 4), his favourite version of the identity
view, definitely does. Of course he may well decide to embrace the breakdown of the spacetime/matter
distinction; and he could draw on the discussion of substantivalism/relationism in philosophy of physics for
support of said embrace (see the end of section 5).
14See sections 4 for different variants of super-substantivalism along these lines. For different accounts of
ontological priority / ontological dependence see Fine (1995), Bricker (2006) Correia (2008).
15This is likely related to a particular super-substantivalist programme in physics, John Wheeler’s Ge-
ometrodynamics, being abandoned in the early 1970s, to the big disappointment of many philosophers of
physics; see Stachel (1972) and Misner (1972) for details of the development of this research programme.
Of course, one particular variant of super-substantivalism being unsuccessful does not say much about the
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although, in many cases, surprisingly briefly. For example, Lewis (1986), p.76, states:16
There are three different conceptions of what the spatiotemporal relations might
be. There is the dualist conception: there are the parts of spacetime itself, and
there are the pieces of matter or fields or whatnot that occupy some of the parts
of spacetime. [...]
There are two simpler monistic conceptions. One of them does away with the
occupants as separate things: we have the parts of spacetime, and their distance
relations are the only spatiotemporal relations. The properties that we usually
ascribe to occupants of spacetime — for instance, properties of mass, charge, field
strength — belong in fact to parts of spacetime itself. When a part of spacetime
has a suitable distribution of local properties, then it is a particle, or a piece of
a field, or a donkey, or what have you.
The other monistic conception does the opposite: it does away with the parts of
spacetime in favour of the occupants (now not properly so called), so that the
only spatiotemporal relations are the distance relations between some of these. I
tend to oppose the third option, at least as applied to our world... . I tend, more
weakly, to oppose the dualist conception as uneconomical.
Lewis effectively claims that the monistic position which takes only spacetime as basic,
i.e. super-substantivalism, is preferable to at least classical substantivalism because of the
latter’s lack of parsimony (it being uneconomical) when postulating two rather than one
fundamental kind of substance. Sider (2001), p. 109-110, gives the same argument with
more force:
First, assume that substantivalism is true, that there are such things as points
and regions of spacetime. There is then the question of whether there is anything
else, whether spatiotemporal objects occupy, but are distinct from, regions of
spacetime, or whether they simply are regions of spacetime.
There is considerable pressure to give the latter answer, for otherwise we seem to
gratuitously add a category of entities to our ontology. All the properties appar-
ently had by an occupant of spacetime can be understood as being instantiated
by the region of spacetime itself. The identification of spatiotemporal objects
with the regions is just crying out to be made.
promise of the family of positions as a whole (compare the abandonment of manifold substantivalism as a
consequence of the hole argument and the subsequent development of more sophisticated versions of sub-
stantivalism).
16Note that Lewis’ characterisation of super-substantivalism goes beyond what I call the core commit-
ment: he claims the super-substantivalist is committed to taking only distance relations between the parts of
spacetime as fundamental. However, it is completely compatible with the super-substantivalist core commit-
ment to take the topological relations or affine structure as equally or even more fundamental than distance
structure. (Indeed, differential geometry tells us that we need topological structure to have metric/distance
structure but not vice versa. Affine structure can be derived from metric structure in pseudo-Riemannian
spacetimes but not in generalisations thereof.)
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Here too, the main argument put forward in favour of super-substantivalism is its parsi-
mony. While relationalism can always claim that it is more parsimonious than substantival-
ism because it postulates only one kind of fundamental object, namely material objects, the
super-substantivalist can claim that he does even better: he does not only get by with one
kind of substance but with only one instantiation of that kind of substance: there is only
one spacetime.
But things are not so simple.17 Even in the context of the classic substantivalism/relationalism
debate, substantivalists have claimed that, despite first appearances, relationalism may not
be more parsimonious than substantivalism after all. For while the substantivalist can refer
to one interrelated corpus of properties of relations possessed by spacetime, the relationalist
has to postulate them as unconnected primitive relations between material objects.18
By contrast, the core commitment of super-substantivalism does not commit one to the
belief that there is only one entity, spacetime. One may be a monist on the categorical level
but a pluralist with regard to the number of elements in that category. Thus, rather than
saying ‘there is only one concrete object, spacetime’, one could also be of the opinion that
‘there is only one kind of concrete objects: parts of spacetime’.19
A pluralistic super-substantivalist, of course, faces the same challenges as the relationalist,
who believes that the only fundamental kind of object in the world is comprised of material
objects. The pluralistic super-substantivalist has to explain why and in what sense the
parts of spacetime are related so as to give rise to the multitude of phenomena we observe:
from extended regions of spacetime, light cones allowing us to distinguish between past
and future, to red billiard balls allowing us to smash windows. He may be able to give a far
simpler account than the monistic super-substantivalist, or he may not; and indeed it may be
that in the end the (normal) substantivalist, who allowed for two rather than one category of
fundamental objects (parts of spacetime and material objects), can give the simplest account
of all.
In the end, this is just speculation, and speculation has to stop at some point. Neither
substantivalism, relationalism nor super-substantivalism as such can be judged more par-
simonious than its competitors; the respective core commitments are just not rich enough.
We need to compare a particular version of super-substantivalism with particular versions
of substantivalism and relationalism, even to hope for a reliable judgement of which posi-
tion tells the simplest story of how the different parts of the world are related. The core
commitments are just the prologue, and knowing the prologue is not enough to judge a
story.20
But, even if we had a definite answer to the question of which approach is the most
parsimonious, what would it tell us? Sure, parsimony is rather attractive philosophically.
But, in the end, we don’t know if the world is simple, and so we don’t know if the simplest
17See Thomas (2013b) for a complementary discussion of the argument from parsimony.
18See Field (1985) and Maudlin (1993), p.194-196.
19Schaffer is a monistic super-substantivalist, thinking that the whole of spacetime has priority over its
parts, while Sider is a pluralistic super-substantivalist, denying priority of the whole of spacetime. Both take
the parts of spacetime to be regions; see Schaffer (2009) and Sider (2001, 2007), respectively.
20I will distinguish between different versions of super-substantivalism in sections 4 and 5.
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approach gives the best possible fit to the world. Let’s be honest and admit that in the
end striving for parsimony amounts to not much more than a ‘principle of laziness’, or
‘principle of pragmatism’, if you will: we look for the simplest approaches because they are
the ones that seem easiest to handle at first sight. Having only one kind of screwdriver has
its advantages: you never have to look where you put the other ones. But it may turn out
that operating with only one kind of screwdriver limits you in how you can handle the actual
world.
Thus, in the end, super-substantivalism has to face the same hard tests that substanti-
valism and relationalism faced in the debate following the rediscovery of the hole argument:
its compatibility with modern physics has to be checked. In order to do this, we have to
forge different concrete variants of super-substantivalism going beyond the core commitment
— concrete enough to be compared to the different variants of substantivalism and relation-
alism in the light of modern physics. Of course, the relevant part of modern physics is field
theory, and general relativity in particular.
3.2 Modern field theory
Hartry Field has argued that even though there is a genuine dispute about whether sub-
stantivalism or relationalism is the right metaphysical stance with respect to a theory based
on a particle ontology, like Newtonian mechanics, this changes when we come to the theo-
ries of modern physics. Here, fields are fundamental entities, either solely or in addition to
particles.
Field argues that a field theory presupposes a substantivalist conception of spacetime.
He writes (Field (1989), p.181):
As I see it, a field theory is simply a theory that assigns causal properties to
space-time points or other space-time regions directly (as opposed to indirectly,
via matter that occupies those points or regions). (Or to be more accurate, it
is the theory that employs causal predicates that apply directly to space-time
points or regions.) For instance, in electromagnetic field theory we assign to each
point in space-time an electromagnetic intensity, irrespective of whether this
point is occupied by matter. Obviously this presupposes a substantival view:
on a relational view, there are no points or other regions of unoccupied space-
time, so the assignment of a property to such a point or region makes no sense.
Consequently, it seems to me that for a physical theory to accord with anything
reasonably called relationalism, that physical theory cannot be a field theory.
To follow Field’s arguments with respect to a pure field theory, i.e. a theory in which
only fields exist — rather than fields alongside material particles — means presupposing a
super-substantivalist conception of spacetime.
But is this true? Does field theory (be it pure or not) commit us to interpreting the fields
as properties of spacetime points? Earman (1989), p.115, sides with Field to some extent by
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admitting that super-substantivalism is a natural interpretation of a pure field theory:21
The second embellishment comes into its own under what can be called super-
substantivalism, the view that space is the only first-order substance in the sense
that space points or regions are the only elements of the domains of the intended
models of the physical worlds.
[...]
To realize super-substantivalism, one doesn’t have to revert to the view that
space is stuff that forms the corpus of bodies, nor does one have to resort to
some outlandish theory. Indeed, modern field theory is not implausibly read as
saying the physical world is fully described by giving the values of various fields,
whether scalar, vector, or tensor, which fields are attributes of the space-time
manifold M .
The second half of the quotation alludes to the distinction between modest and radical super-
substantivalism that we will look at in detail in section 5. Field’s view has been criticized,
especially since he does not really give an argument for why field theory should be interpreted
as asserting that spacetime points (or regions) are substances and fields properties of these
substances; Field merely states this to be the case. Malamant (1982), p.531-532, points out
that surely an argument is needed here: after all, Malament argues, it is fields such as the
electromagnetic field that possess mass-energy content, not the points of spacetime.22
A similar argument can be found in Teller (1996), who writes (p. 382):
Hartry Field (1980, p. 35) argued, very simply, that to do field theories we
must have the space-time points as the things of which the field quantities are
predicated.
But consider the fact that relativity theories drop the distinction between mass
and energy, so that the field quantities, themselves carrying energy, can be seen
as substantival. Thus we can reverse the role of predicate and subject. Instead of
attributing a bit of mass-energy, in the form of a field, to a substantival space-time
point, we can, on the present proposal, attribute a relative space-time location to
a bit of a field — a bit of mass-energy in the form of an electromagnetic field, a
matter density field, or the like. The relative location is just a relational property,
that is, a space-relation to some actually exemplified trajectory.
21Schaffer (2009), p. 10, misreads Earman (1989) as “suggesting” and endorsing super-substantivalism,
yet the latter merely says that modern field theory is “not implausibly read” in a super-substantival fashion.
Indeed Earman does not endorse this view, insetad he ends up defending a view that he locates between
substantivalism and relationalism, a view that gets rid of points and regions entirely and endorses the use
of ‘Einstein Algebras’ as introduced by Geroch (1972), renamed by Earman as ‘Leibniz Algebras’.
22French & Ladyman (2003), p.46 acknowledge both options when they write: “[A] form of metaphysical
underdetermination arises here with the physics supporting both the view of fields as substances whose
properties are instantiated at space-time points (or regions) and the view of fields as nothing but properties
of those space-time points (or regions)”.
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Field could now answer that mass-energy is represented by the mass-energy-momentum
tensor field Tµν , and hence should also be considered as a property of spacetime points,
albeit one that is associated with the spacetime point also possessing the property of an
electromagnetic field (say) being present. In any case, Malament and Teller effectively show
that Schaffer (2009), p.8, is surely too quick when he claims that “everyone in the debate
understands [Tµν ] as a feature of spacetime” — many understand it as a property of material
systems, described by a field.23
What remains is that it seems plausible (Earman) rather than necessary (Field) to in-
terpret (pure) field theories in super-substantivalist terms, to regard fields as properties of
spacetime points or regions.
But if we were to leave it at that, we would overlook an important distinction: that
between geometric and non-geometric properties of spacetime. The metric field gµν allows
us to define spatial distances, temporal durations and a distinction between past and future.
If you believe there is spacetime, then you almost can’t help taking the metric field as
encoding at least some of its paradigmatic properties.24 But the same is not true for the
electromagnetic field: we can interpret an electromagnetic field strength as a property of the
spacetime region it occurs in, but we do not have to.
Thus, there are some fields which can be interpreted as properties of spacetime, and
yet others that have to be interpreted as properties of spacetime;25 if one believes in the
substantival existence of spacetime at all. The question of whether one does justice to
this distinction divides the super-substantivalist camp into two subsets: modest and radical
super-substantivalist positions.
In section 5 we will see that most if not all extensions of the super-substantivalist core
commitment fall into one or other category; but, before we go there, let us examine how
the core commitment can be extended to different positions with flesh and muscles on the
bones.26
23Of course, taking such a position does not mean that the properties of material systems do not depend
on spacetime. In Lehmkuhl (2011), I argue that mass-energy-momentum density Tµν is a property material
systems have only in virtue of their relationship to spacetime structure. However, such a dependence of
important properties of material systems on spacetime structure is not the same as a reduction of these
properties to spacetime structure.
24This is true even for manifold substantivalists, i.e. substantivalists who take only the manifold M as
representing physical spacetime (rather than, say, the pair (M, gµν)). For, even if one regards the metric
field gµν as analogous in almost every respect to the other fields defined on M , it is still the case that gµν
encodes paradigmatically spatiotemporal properties, that it endows the manifold M with a geometry, or —
put more neutrally — that it allows for a geometrical interpretation which other fields lack.
25Of course, which category a given property should be put in depends on which physical theory of physics
one takes as a basis of one’s metaphysical deliberations. If the theory in question is GR, then the metric field
arguably belongs in the ‘has to be interpreted as a property of spacetime’ category, while the electromagnetic
field belongs into the ‘can be interpreted as property of spacetime’. If the theory in question is, say, Kaluza’s
original five-dimensional unified field theory of gravitation and electromagnetism (see Kaluza (1921)), then
both the 4-dimensional metric field and the electromagnetic field arise from projection of the metric field of
5-dimensional spacetime, and are thus equally ‘spacetimy’.
26In this section I have discussed what I regard as the two most promising arguments for super-
substantivalism per se, i.e. for the core commitment. Both Schaffer (2009) and Thomas (2013b) put a
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4 Extensions of the super-substantivalist core commit-
ment
Above I have formulated a minimal extension of the super-substantival core commitment
(MESP) as follows: spacetime is the only substance in the world; spacetime is ontologically
prior to matter. If ‘ontologically prior to’ is identified with ‘reducible to’, a shorter version
would be: All there is is recucible to spacetime.
But identifying ontological priority with reducibility already goes beyond MESP. In-
deed, it is an advantage of MESP that it leaves plenty of possibilities to make the super-
substantivalist position more precise, make it more concrete, bringing into being a veritable
family of positions, rivaling the different forms of substantivalism and relationalism created
in the last few decades.
Currently, the most prominent extension of the core commitment in the metaphysical
literature is surely what Schaffer (2009) called the identity view. The latter forms a sub-family
of super-substantival positions separate from the MESP-family, and all of its positions have in
common that they identify material objects with spacetime regions.27 Some variants identify
every spacetime region with a material object (these variants are preferred by Schaffer; he
calls them the unrestricted identity view),28 others only with spacetime regions that fulfil
certain conditions.29 An alternative is the composition view, which regards material objects
as composed of spacetime regions rather than as identical to them.30
The question of whether the identity and the composition view are really two distinct
views turns on old questions of metaphysics, often discussed using a statue made of clay,
and investigated by pondering the question of whether the statue is or is not identical to
lot of weight on a third argument, which they call the argument from materialisation. In short, the ar-
gument says that super-substantivalism is the only position that can readily explain the alleged fact that
“[m]aterial objects cannot exist without occupying spacetime regions”(Schaffer (2009), p. 141) or, more care-
fully put, “the fact that matter seems to be necessarily spatio-temporally located” (Thomas (2013b), p.120).
My answer is that it is not at all clear that this really is a fact, that it really is necessary for something to
occupy parts of spacetime in order to be material. This doubt is strengthened by the fact that there are
now various approaches in quantum gravity research which start from certain quantum structures (which
are not defined on a space- or spacetime manifold) as fundamental and which aim to derive spacetime as an
emergent entity in the macroscopic limit. In these theories, (quantum) matter does exist without occupying
parts of spacetime, and gives rise to spacetime in some domain. The very conceivability of such approaches
suggests that matter cannot necessarily be bound to a spatio-temporal existence.
27I will argue below that one should generalize the category ‘spacetime regions’ to ‘spacetime parts’, which
contains spacetime regions as a proper subset.
28On this view, even what physicists call empty Minkowski spacetime (or indeed any ‘vacuum solution’ of
General Relativity) would count as one giant material object, by fiat.
29If I had to choose among only different variants of the identity view rather than also being allowed to
choose from (what I think are) far more attractive variants of super-substantivalism, I would choose a variant
where only spacetime regions that possess mass-energy are identified with material objects. The reason is
that, I think, there are strong reasons to regard mass-energy as an essential (or, if you want, necessary)
property of matter, as argued in Lehmkuhl (2011).
30Thomas (2013b), chapter 3, attributes this version of super-substantivalism to the early Newton, ex-
pressed in his De Gravitatione.
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the clay it is composed of. I will not elaborate on the issue as it is clear that it does not
pertain to super-substantivalism as such; whatever position you take with regard to the
relationship between identity and composition will transfer from the statue and clay it’s
made of to material objects and the spacetime regions they are made of according to super-
substantivalism.31 However, I note that the composition view as applied to material objects
and spacetime (just as in the case of the statue and clay) has the advantage that one can
give a better account of a process that amounts to creating a material object from parts
of spacetime. Furthermore, the composition view allows for the composed object to have
properties different from those possessed by its constituents.32 Indeed, this is the super-
substantivalist position that Thomas (2013b), chapter 3, attributes to the early Newton: he
denies the Cartesian identification of matter and space, but thinks of matter as created from
space, whilst seeing them as belonging to two different categories nonetheless.33
We have seen that two ways to extend the super-substantivalist core commitment involve
saying that material objects are either identical to or composed of spacetime regions. How-
ever, we should note that even just thinking of spacetime as composed of spacetime regions
goes beyond the core commitments of both substantivalism and super-substantivalism. We
should instead speak of the parts whereof spacetime is composed; this leaves open whether
those parts are manifold points or regions, discrete grains not representable by a manifold,
or structural aspects of spacetime like its affine or metric structure. Indeed, in the context
of modern differential geometry it seems much more natural to think of the building blocks
of spacetime not as regions but (in that hierarchical order) as the chain of manifold struc-
ture, topological structure, projective and conformal structure, affine structure, and, finally,
metric structure. Different spacetime theories assume spacetime to be composed of different
members of this list, and that they are related to one another in different ways. Speaking of
spacetime as composed of spacetime regions does not do justice to this intricate network of
ontological dependences; but either way, speaking of spacetime as composed of parts allows
for (super-)substantivalists who believe these parts to be regions, and others who believe the
parts to be the above structural aspects.
Let us come back to the question of what may be meant by the assertion that spacetime
is ontologically prior to matter in MESP extension of the core commitment. A minimal
requirement for ontological priority is that the relation is asymmetrical and irreflexive: if A
is ontologically prior to B then B is not ontologically prior to A; and nothing is ontologically
prior to itself.
31If the identity and the composition relationship are concluded not to be identical, in particular if the
composition relationship is taken to imply that that which is composing is ontologically prior to that which
is composed, then the composition view is an extension of the MESP (familiy of) positions.
32A gas has a temperature even if the particles its made of do not, and a spacetime manifold has the
property of being ‘connected’ (in a technical sense) even if no point by itself has that property; more on this
and the connection to the debate between reductionism and emergentism below.
33For Newton in De Grav, matter, being composed of space, is a substance, whereas space itself is not.
This means that Newton is not so easily categorized as a substantivalist as is often done; however, it is
clear that Newton (in De Grav) thought of space as ontolologically prior to matter. Thus, even though
classifying him as a straightforward substantivalist is tricky, it is clear that he believed in the ‘super-’ of
super-substantivalism.
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One way of spelling out what it means for A to be ontologically prior to B is to say that
B is reducible to A. The follow-up question is then: what are the necessary and sufficient
conditions for something to be reducible? Of course, there is a huge literature on this in
metaphysics and philosophy of science. Even the proponent of the identity view can be
a reductionist if he sees ‘being identical to’ as sufficient for reducibility; yet, he faces the
problem that identity is a symmetrical relation while reducibility, on all accounts I think, is
not.34
Another brand of super-substantivalism may think of spacetime as ontologically prior to
material objects by virtue of the latter being emergent from the former, a position famously
attributed to Samuel Alexander.35 Just as with ‘reducibility’, the most important question is
how ‘emergence’ is defined. A promising view, offered by Butterfield (2011a,b) defines emer-
gence “as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison class”. Defined
in this way, emergence is in principle compatible with reduction, if one follows Butterfield
in defining reduction as deduction with the help of auxiliary conditions. Either way, with-
out going into details of the different definitions of emergence that have been put forward:
thinking of matter as emergent from spacetime also allows for it to have properties different
from the spacetime parts it emerges from. However, matter being emergent from spacetime
can only be a sufficient, not a necessary condition for spacetime to be ontologically prior to
matter.
Also, it seems sensible to take reducibility of matter to spacetime to be sufficient for
spacetime to be ontologically prior to matter; it is less clear whether the condition is also
necessary (in which case ‘ontologically secondary to’ and ‘reducible to’ would be synonyms).
Still it is clear that a big subset of the super-substantival family of positions will spell out
ontological priority via reducibilty.
The above discussion suggests that we have a clear handle on what counts as ‘matter’
and what as ‘spacetime (structure)’, and that we can look at the two sides of the divide and
wonder whether one is ontologically prior to the other. Of course, one of the most important
lessons of modern spacetime theory is that the distinction between matter and spacetime
has become more and more blurred. Indeed, most of the debate that resulted in spelling
out different forms of (normal) substantivalism starts from the discussion of whether GR’s
gµν field should be classified as encoding part of spacetime (structure), or whether it is ‘a
field like any other’, i.e. so close to matter fields like the electromagnetic field Fµν that a
categorical distinction is unjustified.36 However, I take it that both camps in this dispute
agree that if one takes spacetime to be a substance, then the gµν field, among other things
giving a measure of distance between points of spacetime, can be interpreted as encoding
important properties of that substance, or as endowing spacetime with these properties. The
question for the super-substantivalist now is which other properties can be taken to describe
properties or aspects of spacetime. This brings us to the distinction between modest and
34For similar reasons, supervenience is unlikely sufficient for ontological priority, if one takes the superve-
nience relation to be reflexive and not asymmetrical.
35See Thomas (2013a) for details.
36See Anderson (1999), Brown (2009, 2007) and Rovelli (2004) for the latter view, and Maudlin (1993,
1989), Hoefer (1996) and Pooley (2013, forthcoming) for the former view.
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radical super-substantivalism.
5 Modest and radical super-substantivalism
The family of super-substantivalist positions neatly divides into two camps. Only one camp is
willing and capable of engaging with physics; the other is a set of super-substantival positions
that can be maintained no matter what physics tells us about the nature of spacetime. I
will argue that philosophy should engage primarily with the first camp, even though recent
years have seen it concentrate exclusively on the second camp.
The two sets of family members correspond to what Skow (2005), p.66-68, called radical
and modest super-substantivalism, respectively. The distinction comes from different answers
to the question of which fundamental properties spacetime is allowed to instantiate.
For a modest super-substantivalist, there is no real difference between saying ‘This spatial
region has a diameter of 8 inches’ and the statement ‘This spatial region is red’. The
modest super-substantivalist allows spacetime to instantiate (on the fundamental level) not
only topological and geometrical properties but also the properties we normally regard as
instantiated by matter, such as colour, mass, electric charge or momentum density.
As far as I can see, most if not all metaphysicians advocating super-substantivalism
belong to the modest camp. Schaffer (2009), p. 139, makes this particularly clear when he
asks
Once one has pinned the geometrical and mereological properties directly onto
the receptacle, why stop there? Why not also pin the masses and charges onto the
receptacle as well? In general, is there some principled reason for using spacetime
as the pincushion for only some of the fundamental properties?
It is completely clear to Schaffer that one can attribute to spacetime regions properties
such as mass or colour just as much as extension or circumference. But, as pointed out in
the last section, he thereby does not do justice to the distinction between properties/fields
that even the dualistic substantivalist has to interpret as aspects of spacetime structure (like
the metric field gµν in GR), and those where he can but does not have to do so (like the
electromagnetic field Fµν in GR).
The modest super-substantivalist is willing to leave it at that. He just shrugs his shoulders
when asked whether attributing the properties ‘red’ or ‘solid’ to a spacetime region does not
seem to have a different quality from attributing to it the property of being ‘extended’.
The radical super-substantivalist disagrees. He agrees with the dualistic substantivalist
that only geometrical (and topological) properties should be attributed to spacetime and
its parts. As a consequence, he has to offer an account of how apparently non-geometrical
poperties like colour, electric charge or solidity can be reduced to (or indeed emerge from)
geometrical or topological properties. Sklar (1974), p. 166, is very clear about what he
thinks of the two camps of super-substantivalism:
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The identification of all of the material world with the structured world of space-
time is not to be interpreted as the linguistic trick of simply replacing objects by
the region of spacetime they occupy and some novel “objectifying feature” — say
replacing ‘There is a desk in the (X,T) region’ by ‘The (X,T) region desks.’ The
scientific program of reducing matter to spacetime is rather more on the order
of the scientific program of reducing material objects to arrays of their micro-
scopic constituents or identifying light rays with electromagnetic radiation. In
the reduction, the assertion of the existence of a material object at some space-
time location is to be shown reducible to the assertion of some spacetime feature
holding in the spacetime region, say its having a certain intrinsic curvature over
the region.
Even though I sympathise with Sklar, it has to be conceded that he is somewhat un-
fair towards the modest super-substantivalist. True, modest super-substantivalism is not a
scientific research programme. It is not a stance that could motivate research in physics,
or serve as guiding principle for such research. Modest super-substantivalism is a purely
metaphysical standpoint that can be taken quite independently from the physical theory we
find to be true, and it is motivated by purely philosophical advantages.
That is not bad in itself. But it cannot be denied that a philosophical standpoint like
radical super-substantivalism that can be fruitful for physics, motivate it and in turn be
questioned by it, is a very desirable thing.
This is what radically super-substantivalist positions offer: they are programmes that
pose a real challenge to physics, offering fruitful heuristics for scientific research, and can in
turn be challenged by it. One important example of a radically suber-substantival research
programme is John Wheeler’s ‘Geometrodynamics’. His aims are best summarised in the
following quotation:37
Is space-time only an arena within which fields and particles move about as
‘physical’ and ‘foreign’ entities? Or is the four-dimensional continuum all there
is? Is curved empty geometry a kind of magic building material out of which
everything in the physical world is made: (1) slow curvature in one region of
space describes a gravitational field; (2) a rippled geometry with a different type
of curvature somewhere else describes an electromagnetic field; (3) a knotted-up
region of high curvature describes a concentration of charge and mass-energy
that moves like a particle? Are fields and particles foreign entities immersed in
geometry, or are they nothing but geometry?
The programme gives us one example of how the super-substantival core commitment
may be expanded into a precise position which brings metaphyics and physics closer to-
gether. Rather than leaving it at saying that all properties are properties of spacetime
(modest super-substantivalism), or even at saying that non-geometrical properties have to
37Wheeler (1962a), p.361.
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be somehow reduced to geometrical properties, Wheeler suggests which apparently non-
geometrical properties might be reducible to which geometrical properties. In his approach,
the gravitational field is reduced to one kind of spacetime curvature, whereas the electro-
magnetic field is reduced to another.38 Particles are reconceptualised as small regions of
spacetime in which the curvature is particularly strong and of a certain form; for stable
particles, gravitational and electromagnetic curvature have to keep each other in balance.
Wheeler called such constructs ‘geons, gravitational-electromagnetic entities’.39
Wheeler’s research programme was abandoned in the 1970s.40 For Sklar is right: every
version of radical super-substantivalism is a scientific research programme, and as such it can
succeed or fail, or be revived after it was judged to have failed.41 Wheeler wanted to reduce
gravity, electromagnetism, and mass-energy to four-dimensional curvature. More recently,
other research programmes motivated by radical super-substantivalism have been proposed.
Wesson (2007) and collaborators have revisited Theodor Kaluza’s and Oskar Klein’s idea
that spacetime is really five- rather than four-dimensional. Like Klein (1926, 1928), Wesson
et al. postulate the vacuum Einstein equations as the field equations of the five-dimensional
spacetime. In contrast to the founding fathers of the idea, they get much further in deriving
the matter we see in four dimensions from the geometrical properties of the five-dimensional
spacetime. In a different, quantum-mechanical, research programme, Bilson-Thompson et al.
(2007) start out from the mathematics of Loop Quantum Gravity, introducing a canonical
split of spacetime into space and time and assuming that space fundamentally consists of
discrete ‘grains’ of space. The fundamental particles of the standard model of particle physics
38Wheeler solved the Einstein-Maxwell equations for the electromagnetic field tensor Fµν , pointing out
that Rainich and Misner had shown that this is possible only if the curvature tensor fulfils the two properties
R = 0 (1)
and
R βα R
γ
β = δ
γ
α (
1
4
RστR
στ ) (2)
The result is then put into Maxwell’s equations, and thus the Einstein-Maxwell equations are formulated in
terms of R ωµνσ alone rather than R
ω
µνσ and Fµν . With the definition
Wτ := (−g) 12 τλµν
(∇µRλβ)R νβ
RγδRγδ
(3)
the Maxwell equations then become
∇ηWτ −∇τWη = 0 , (4)
which are equations of fourth order in the metric. See Wheeler (1962b), pp.250-253.
39Einstein (1919), unbeknownst to Wheeler, had tried out a mathematically similar approach, interestingly
without radically super-substantivalist motivations.
40See Stachel (1972), Graves (1972), Graves & Earman (1972), Misner (1972) for details of the reasons.
41Giulini (forthcoming) discusses the extent to which research in general relativity showed that the ideals
of geometrodynamics were fulfilled to a much larger extent by results in canonical GR (a formulation of GR
with which geometrodynamics had started out with) than Wheeler and Misner had antipicated when they
abandoned the approach.
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(and their most important properties rest mass, spin and different kinds of charge) are aimed
to be reduced to different states of these grains. Thus, elementary particles would be nothing
other than quanta of space.
We see that both in the classical and in the quantum domains there are very different
ways in which one could aim to reduce the apparently non-geometrical properties of what
we perceive as matter to geometrical or topological properties of spacetime. And each path
corresponds to a particular variant of radical super-substantivalism. Many more than those
already pursued in physics and described above are possible: e.g., the mass of an electron
could be reduced not to the curvature structure of spacetime but to its affine structure, the
spin of the electron related to the torsion structure of spacetime and its electric charge to
the topological structure of spacetime.42
Which aspect of spacetime structure matter is associated with (curvature is only one
possibility) will also determine whether an empty (matter-free) spacetime is allowed. If
matter is reducible to curvature structure alone, then we can have empty spacetime without
losing a grip on its fundamental structure; if it corresponds to certain topological properties,
then we cannot have a spacetime without the presence of matter — even though it would
still be derivative of spacetime, it would also be necessarily co-existent with it. We see
that even within the radical catgory, there are plenty of distinctions to be made, different
super-substantival outlooks.
Not much can happen to the modest super-substantivalist, neither good nor bad things:
however physics develops, there is a way for him to uphold his position. In contrast, the
different versions of radical super-substantivalism have the potential to provide physics with
a fruitful heuristic, and take part in actually learning something about the world. If we were
to find out that, say, electrons are nothing more than excitations of a discrete spacetime,
then we would have found out something genuinely new about matter, space and time. The
modest super-substantivalist can hope for no such event; his position is too far removed from
physics.
As pointed out by Sklar, radical super-substantivalism is more than a metaphysical po-
sition. It is a research programme, a challenge and motivator for physics. At the same
time, it is philosophically even more attractive than modest super-substantivalism. For the
latter has to allow both geometrical and non-geometrical properties as categories, whereas
the radical super-substantivalist tries to get by with only geometrical and topological prop-
erties and structures. He can even expect to learn something new about matter once he has
associated it with particular aspects of spacetime structure, for the relationships between
different aspects of spacetime structure we know of are likely to direct our attention to as
yet unknown relationships between the different kinds of matter and their properties.
The radical super-substantivalist may fail. But, if he succeeds, the reward is great.
42Relating electric charge to the topology of a multiply connected four-dimensional spacetime was actually
part of Wheeler’s programme; the other two options named here have not, to my knowledge, been pursued
yet.
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